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“Sovereign is he who decides on the state of exception.”1
In a study of the “solidarity” between democracy and totalitarianism, 
Giorgio Agamben observes that there are two canonical approaches to 
the interpretation of power today. The “traditional approach” balances 
juridical models, which examine the legitimation of power, with institu-
tional ones, which examine the organization of the state. The “biopoliti-
cal” approach assumes that power is exercised not at the level not of law, 
nor that of the state, but at the level of life itself. Biopolitical power—
biopower—takes administrative charge of life by means of two technol-
ogies: the disciplines, which tend to grow the body’s forces, and regula-
tory controls, which tend to foster the life of “the species.”2 Agamben 
seeks the “point of intersection” between the two approaches (6). What 
hinge joins the juridico-institutional apparatus with the proliferation 
and regulation of life? Agamben points out that the sovereign seizes hold 
of life by making an exception. Such is “the paradox” of sovereignty 
(15). The sovereign stands inside and outside the law simultaneously. 
He, or, in the present case, she defi nes the sphere of the law’s validity 
by deciding what can be lawfully cast beyond it, inscribing within the 
body of the law an “exteriority” that “animates it and gives it meaning” 
(18 and 26). This exteriority is life itself. It is what in the law undoes 
the law, for life itself—bare life—is what can be killed without therefore 
being murdered (28).
The state of exception, according to Agamben, is the fundamental 
political structure of “our age” (20). When he says “our” age, though, he 
assumes we know who “we” are. Hence to understand what age is ours 
we must fi rst determine our genre. We have to decide what kind “we” 
are. There can be neither kind nor class, however, neither genus nor 
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genre, without the exception. A genre includes its exception in the form 
of an exclusion, a trait that belongs without belonging (18). Inclusive 
exclusion is therefore the very law of genre. Agamben says it is law in its 
“originary” state (26). “Law is made of nothing,” he explains, “but what 
it manages to capture inside itself through the inclusive exclusion of the 
exceptio” (27). To consolidate itself, the law suspends itself, addressing 
its performative violence to an “exteriority” that it includes. Hence the 
exceptional, sui generis, nature of the exception endows the law with its 
“particular,” sui generis, “force” (18). What it captures, and what sets it 
in action, is what it bans.
The space of exception is “unlocalizable,” but Agamben claims that 
“our age” nevertheless grants it “a permanent and visible location” in the 
concentration camp. The camp is a modern paradigm, not just a space 
of confi nement, but “the absolute space of exception” (20). The excep-
tion, however, is what every paradigm excludes. It should hardly come 
as a surprise, then, that an exception inevitably emerges to the paradig-
matic exception. The European powers used to project “a free and jurid-
ically empty space”—the phrase is Carl Schmitt’s—onto the surface of 
“the New World” (36). For centuries the Americas—and among them 
the Canadas—belonged without belonging to the European sovereigns. 
In Canada today the state of exception is distributed across “the land 
itself.” The crown enjoys paramount title, but the crown’s title includes, 
in the form of a “burden” that it simultaneously excludes, the prior title 
of aboriginal societies to the same land.
The title question fi rst came before the Canadian courts in May, 1885. 
The province of Ontario asked the Chancery Division of the High Court 
of Ontario to stop the St. Catharine’s Milling and Lumber Company from 
cutting and removing timber from an area northwest of Lake Superior. 
The province argued that it had not granted the company permission 
to log (R v. St. Catharine’s Milling and Lumber Company, OR Vol. 10, at 
196–7). The company responded that it had received permission from 
the government of Canada. The court had to decide whether the disputed 
lands fell under provincial or federal jurisdiction. The decision hinged on 
the question of aboriginal title. The company argued that the lands had 
“until recently” been claimed by bands of the Saulteaux First Nations. 
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A delegation of Saulteaux chiefs, however, had ceded aboriginal title to 
the Dominion of Canada in the Northwest Angle Treaty of 1873 (Treaty 
Three). The company argued that title now vested in the federal crown 
(198–9). The Attorney General for Ontario responded that aboriginal 
people had no title to cede. They had only a right to occupy the land. The 
treaty, moreover, had extinguished that right and did not transfer it (199). 
Aboriginal title—indeed aboriginality itself—emerged onto the surface of 
Canadian legal discourse in a confl ict between two determinations—the 
dominion and the province—of one sovereign.
The case was appealed twice before it went before the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council of Great Britain. Lord Watson deliv-
ered the Committee’s verdict in 1888. He found that the disputed area 
came under the Royal Proclamation of 1763, issued by George the Third 
shortly after the Treaty of Paris. The Proclamation, wrote Watson, grants 
aboriginal people “a personal and usufructuary right” to their traditional 
“hunting grounds” but makes that right dependent on the sovereign’s 
“Will and Pleasure” (St.Catharine’s Milling and Luber Company v. The 
Queen 14 AC, at 53–4; The Royal Proclamation, Act 7, 1763, 4–5). It 
is a “personal” right because lands reserved for aboriginal people can be 
surrendered only to the crown. It is “usufructuary” because it entitles 
aboriginal people to harvest the fruits of the lands and waters. It is the 
sovereign’s to give, though, and the sovereign’s to take away. According 
to the Proclamation, the lands set aside for aboriginal people are “parts 
of Our dominions and territories” (4–5). Watson took this to mean that 
the sovereign has “a substantial and paramount estate, underlying the 
Indian title.” The sovereign’s underlying title becomes a “plenum domi-
num,” he added, as soon as “the Indian title” is “surrendered or other-
wise extinguished.” He declined to outline “the precise quality” of the 
“Indian right” (55), but he remarked three pages later that “the Indian 
title” is “a mere burden” on the sovereign’s title (58). Indeed the law con-
ceives of aboriginal title as a white man’s burden in the classic sense: the 
sovereign has a chivalric duty to protect aboriginal societies from exploi-
tation by third parties. It is a burden that survives to this day3
So in 1763, the crown, at its pleasure, created a state of exception. 
It gave aboriginal people a title that belongs without belonging to the 
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genre of “title,” a right that belongs without belonging to the genre of 
“right.” The inclusive exclusion of one title both inside and outside an-
other is not an anomaly of Canadian law. Sovereign power, according 
to Agamben, “is this very impossibility of distinguishing between out-
side and inside” (Homo Sacer 37). The sovereign occupies the threshold 
between the rule and the exception and so can consolidate its own title 
only by inclusively excluding another, more original title.
Yet the Proclamation theory was to become the exception rather than 
the rule in Canadian law. By 1997 the courts had decided that aborig-
inal title has its source instead in the common law. In fact, as Kent 
McNeil points out, they had found not one common-law source, but 
two, and were cautiously “vacillating” between them.4 McNeil surveys 
both sources in his 1989 book, Common Law Aboriginal Title. The fi rst 
is occupation. The common law has long acknowledged that the oc-
cupation of land constitutes prima facie proof of possession (Common 
Law Aboriginal Title 73–4, 197). Occupation, moreover, is a matter of 
fact. You are assumed to be in occupation if you have exclusive con-
trol of a parcel of land and intend “to hold or use it” for some purpose 
(201). Nobody disputes that aboriginal societies have been on the land 
in Canada since time immemorial. Possession, however, is matter of law. 
Hence it can only be established within a legal system (197). Aboriginal 
societies could not have had possession of the land until the common 
law was extended to Canada. So here is the question: does an occupation 
that predates the law constitute proof of possession under the law?
The acquisition of territory is the concern of international law (the 
law between states). Historically, though, while English municipal law 
(the law within the state) conceded that it the crown’s right to acquire 
foreign territories, the English courts nevertheless reserved their right 
to decide exactly how a territory was acquired (131). By the end of 
the eighteenth century, they had recognized three modes of acquisition: 
conquest, cession and settlement. How did the sovereign acquire those 
territories that now comprise Canada? The Supreme Court of Canada 
ruled in 2004 that the First Nations were never conquered. Many, how-
ever, signed treaties with the crown, which is a form of cession.5 Others, 
such as Nisa’a and Tsimshian First Nations, tried to negotiate treaties in 
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the nineteenth century, but until the end of the twentieth century the 
crown declined to negotiate treaties with them. What then is the legal 
status of an inhabited territory that was never conquered, nor ceded, but 
was settled nonetheless?
McNeil argues that English law applied to foreign territories as soon 
as the crown acquired them. The law assumed, moreover, that the 
people who were then in occupation had possession of the land (206). 
They enjoyed the legal status of “mere possessors,” and “a mere possessor 
whose possession is not known to be wrongful,” according to McNeil, 
“has a presumptive title which enables him [or presumably her] both 
to defend and recover possession” (207 and 75). He calls this the doc-
trine of common law aboriginal title. It is a genre that extends to all of 
the lands occupied by aboriginal people when the crown asserted sov-
ereignty and includes the subsurface and whatever minerals it contains. 
Furthermore it entitles the possessors to fee simple estates. No member 
of an indigenous society, though, would have a “severable,” that is, “in-
dividual,” estate; title would instead vest in “all members” and would 
include not only reserve lands, but lands traditionally used for resource 
extraction (213).
The common law, however, is just one source of aboriginal title. 
The second is customary law. Today the courts acknowledge that when 
Europeans fi rst arrived in Canada, aboriginal people were already here, 
using the land, living in organized societies, and following their own 
traditions, rules and customs. But were the rights they enjoyed under 
customary law carried forward into the common law post-contact? 
According to the doctrine of recognition, the residents of an acquired 
territory lose what rights they had under customary law unless the 
crown expressly acknowledges those rights, for example in legislation 
(166). According to the doctrine of continuity, the common law rec-
ognizes customary laws governing civil matters, such as property rights, 
provided there is nothing repugnant in those laws (181). McNeil argues 
that the courts have historically tended to favor continuity over recogni-
tion. In 1918, in R v Southern Rhodesia, Lord Sumner ruled that private 
property rights survive the act of conquest unless the crown explicitly 
states its intention to diminish or modify them.6 In 1921, in Amodu 
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Tijani v Secretary, Southern Nigeria, Viscount Haldane found that com-
munal private property rights survive the act of cession even though the 
underlying title to the land passes to the crown.7
The acquisition of territory does not replace one law with anoth-
er, but rather opens up a place for one law within the other, estab-
lishing the sovereign’s authority where the sovereign has no authority. 
Customary law belongs without belonging to the common law. It folds 
into it and fl ows out of it simultaneously. It is that which in the law 
suspends the law (Derrida “Force of Law” 991). Hence the state of ex-
ception conjures up the specter of a law that is both inside and outside 
the law: a law that both obeys and breaks the law. What kind of law 
does violence to the law in the form of the law? Walter Benjamin iden-
tifi es two great genres of violence. There is a violence that makes and 
preserves the law, and there is a “hostile counterviolence” that destroys 
the law (241, 249, 251). Law-making violence is “mythic” and tends 
to preserve the law from the inside; law-destroying violence is “divine” 
and tends to undo the law from the “outside” (249, 251). There is, 
however, another genre of violence. Benjamin mentions it, but he does 
not name it, perhaps because it escapes the opposition between the 
mythic and the divine altogether. This other, nameless violence errupts 
inside and outside the law simultaneously. Benjamin fi nds its traces in 
the deeds of the criminal mastermind: “In the great criminal this vio-
lence confronts the law with the threat of declaring a new law” (241). 
The “public” is horrifi ed by it. The state, in contrast, fears it, not be-
cause it breaks the law, but because it sets up “a new law” within the 
law. What is frightful is the “lawmaking character” of the lawbreak-
ing act (241). Jacques Derrida, in his commentary on Benjamin, calls 
it “mystical” violence and observes that it is neither legal nor illegal in 
the moment when it sets into action (“Force of Law” 943). But it is no 
longer a criminal violence. It is instead fully legitimate “What the state 
fears,” Derrida confi rms, “is not so much crime or brigandage, even on 
the scale of the mafi a or heavy drug traffi c . . . The State is afraid of 
fundamental, founding violence, that is, violence able to justify, to le-
gitimate (begründen, ‘to found’) or to transform relations of law. . . so 
to present itself as having a right to law . . . a violence that is not an ac-
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cident arriving from outside the law” (989). What Canada fears today 
is not the drug lord, but the aboriginal fi sher, for only the subject of 
aboriginal rights has the authority to set up a new law within the law. 
In May of 1984 Ronald Edward Sparrow was fi ned for fi shing with a 
net that exceeded the maximum length allowed under the Musqueam 
band’s food fi shing license. He responded that his aboriginal right to 
fi sh outweighed the sovereign’s right to regulate the fi shery. He was nei-
ther convicted nor acquitted (R v Sparrow 1 SCR, at 1083 and 1121). 
Instead, the Supreme Court of Canada used his case to outline a test 
for deciding in what circumstances the sovereign can justifi ably in-
fringe an aboriginal right, a test for balancing the rule against the ex-
ception. Sparrow enjoyed the kind of right that falls both inside and 
outside the law.
McNeil agrees that “local law, whether customary or otherwise” might 
well prove to be “a good source of indigenous rights, including land 
rights,” (Common Law 193) but he warns that it is diffi cult to establish 
the principles of customary law in court, in part because “the past of in-
digenous groups,” as he puts it, is “obscured in legend and myth” (214). 
The Supreme Court of British Columbia shared his ethnocentrism and 
so, in 1991, it confi rmed his fears. The hereditary chiefs of the Gitxsan 
and Wet’suwet’en nations had fi led suit in 1984 against the province 
of British Columbia, claiming ownership of, and the right to govern, 
traditional Gitxsan territories bordering the Skeena, Nass and Babine 
Rivers, and traditional Wet’suwet’en territories bordering the Bulkley 
and Fraser-Nechako Rivers. The Gitxsan proposed to recite oral histo-
ries called adaakw in order to establish their pre-contact occupation of 
the land; the Wet’suwet’en proposed to perform traditional songs called 
kungax for the same purpose (Culhane 120). The trial judge allowed the 
evidence to be heard under an exception to the hearsay rule but found 
in his fi nal, 1991 decision that adaakw and kungax were of “dubious 
value” in proving the use and occupation of land (Delgamuukw v. British 
Columbia 79 DLR 4th at 260). The Supreme Court of Canada would 
later fi nd that the problem lay not in the supposed “obscurity” of ab-
original legend and myth but in the trial judge’s treatment of evidence 
(Delagmuukw v. British Columbia 153 DLR 4th at 230).
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McNeil remarks that the courts could relieve the plaintiffs of the 
burden of proof by displacing aboriginal title from customary law to the 
common law (304). Juridical utterances, he notes, have substantial per-
formative force, but “judges” have so far declined to mobilize it in the de-
fense of aboriginal rights: “the fact is that judges have not performed the 
law-making function which on this view should be assumed by them” 
(304). He nevertheless warns them to handle it with caution. The aim 
is not to overturn the law, but to preserve it from that nameless violence 
which threatens to declare a new law from inside the law. The result is a 
benevolent and scrupulously well-intentioned assimilationism. 
The law-making function, however, is not without its dangers. The 
fact that judges have the power to make a law that goes against the law 
does not necessarily mean that they will deploy their power in favor of 
aboriginal people and interests. McNeil is aware of the danger. Indeed 
he fi nds an example of it in the United States Supreme Court’s 1823 
decision in Johnson v McIntosh. English law says there are three ways 
of acquiring territory. Chief Justice Marshall, however, added a fourth: 
discovery. The First Nations of North America were the rightful occu-
pants of the soil, he wrote, and occupation gave them a just claim to 
possession. Discovery nevertheless gave the discovering nation ultimate 
title and the “exclusive right” to acquire the land from its occupants. 
But its occupants were not prepared to give it up (Johnson v. McIntosh. 
8 Wheat. 543 at 572–3 and 587). The discovering nation therefore had 
two choices: it could either abandon the country altogether or enforce 
its claims by the sword (590). The British crown elected to conquer 
territories that already belonged to its dominions. It waged war on its 
own subjects (McNeil Common law 246). Marshall conceded that it 
is “extravagant” to convert a title won by discovery into a title won by 
conquest, but he observed that it had become “the law of the land” 
(591). McNeil accuses him of making a law that is doubly against the 
law: “what Marshall did was invent a body of law which was virtually 
without precedent” (301). The example indicates that there is no way to 
determine, in advance, what kind of law the law-making function will 
make. Hence there is no solid ground for asserting that common law is 
better suited than customary law to defend aboriginal title.
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McNeil nevertheless goes on to conclude that Canadian courts have 
had “ample opportunity” to break with a tradition of law that breaks 
the law and to return instead to the “fundamental principles of the 
common law,” for if the land’s “indigenous occupiers” did have “a right 
to fee simple estates” when the British crown asserted sovereignty over 
its North American territories, he argues, then “(statutory bars aside) 
no one can contend that it is too late to declare the law, and enforce the 
right” (304). But the courts have chosen instead to create rights that 
belong without belonging to the genre of rights: “They have purported 
to accord land rights of some sort to indigenous people, but have not 
felt constrained to equate the interest held by them with any precise 
English law interest” (303). In Canada, these rights that are not quite 
rights have come to be known as sui generis aboriginal rights.
Ironically, the Supreme Court of Canada brought aboriginal title into 
the common law in the 1970s—but only to chase it out again. The Nisa’a 
tribal council asked the Supreme Court of British Columbia in 1967 to 
declare that the aboriginal title to the Nass River valley had never been 
extinguished. The trial judge found in 1969 that even if an aboriginal 
title had existed at common law, it had been “totally extinguished” prior 
to1871, the year British Columbia entered confederation, by thirteen 
colonial acts of legislation, proclamation and ordinance—the so-called 
“Calder thirteen” (Calder et al. v. Attorney-General of British Columbia, 8 
DLR 3rd at 82) The British Columbia Court of Appeal decided in 1970 
that aboriginal title has no basis in customary law because the Nisa’a had 
no concept of private property until after they came into contact with 
settler society (Calder et al. v. Attorney-General of British Columbia, 13 
DLR 3rd at 66). The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the action on 
a technicality in 1973: the plaintiffs, it turned out, had neglected to ask 
the province for permission to sue it, as the law then required them to 
do. On the title question, though, the Court was evenly split.
Justice Judson wrote for the three judges who favored dismissing the 
appeal. He found that British Columbia is not included in the lands set 
aside for fi rst nations in the Royal Proclamation. Hence the Nisa’a could 
not hold up the Proclamation as a source of aboriginal title. But they did 
not have to. For aboriginal title is a matter of common law: “the fact is,” 
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said Judson, “that when the settlers came, the Indians were there, orga-
nized in societies and occupying the land as their forefather had done for 
centuries. This is what Indian title means and it does not help one in the 
solution of this problem to call it [as Lord Watson had in St Catherine’s 
Milling ] a ‘personal and usufructuary right’” (Calder et al. v. Attorney-
General of British Columbia 34 DLR 3rd at 156). Since occupation is 
proof of possession, and since presumptive title comes with possession, 
Judson concluded that the Nisga’a did have title to their land “when the 
settlers came.” And then he took it away again: “this right was ‘depen-
dent on the goodwill of the sovereign’” and could be extinguished at the 
sovereign’s will and pleasure.8 Paradoxically, though Judson affi rmed that 
the Nisga’a territory fell outside the scope of the Proclamation, he nev-
ertheless decided, like Lord Watson before him, that Nisga’a title hinged 
on a phrase from the Proclamation—“Our Will and Pleasure.” Hence 
he argued in two directions at once: 1) aboriginal title exists at common 
law and is not the sovereign’s to grant; 2) aboriginal title depends on the 
sovereign’s will and can be extinguished at its pleasure. Nisa’a title be-
longs without belonging to the Proclamation; the Proclamation applies 
without applying to Nisa’a title. Judson concluded that the trial judge 
was correct when he rule that aboriginal title, “if it ever existed,” had 
been extinguished by the performative violence of nine proclamations 
issued by the colonial governor and four ordinances passed by the colo-
nial legislative council from 1858 to 1870: “All thirteen reveal a unity 
of intention to exercise, and the legislative exercising, of absolute sov-
ereignty over all the lands of British Columbia, a sovereignty inconsis-
tent with any confl icting interest, including one as to ‘aboriginal title, 
otherwise known as Indian title’.”9 Aboriginal title was a burden on the 
crown’s title, and the crown had discharged that burden by setting aside 
reserves for the exclusive use of the colony’s fi rst nations.
Justice Hall wrote for the three judges who favored allowing the appeal. 
He found that the trial judge was so preoccupied with the three conven-
tional indicia of ownership—specifi c delineation, exclusive possession, 
and right of alienation—that he “overlooked” the fact “that possession 
is of itself proof of ownership” at common law (Calder et al. v. Attorney-
General of British Columbia 34 DLR 3rd at 187). The Nisa’a had been 
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in possession since time immemorial. They did not have to prove their 
title. It was up to the crown to prove that their title had been extin-
guished. But Hall went further. He reviewed the evidence and conclud-
ed that aboriginal title has a second, parallel source in aboriginal custom-
ary law. The Nisa’a “are and were,” he wrote, “a distinct cultural entity 
with concepts of ownership indigenous to their culture,” and the Nisa’a 
law of property, he stressed, was fully “capable of articulation under the 
common law” (190). He set up “Nisa’a law” inside the common law even 
as he located its source outside the common law. “The aboriginal Indian 
title,” he was careful to note, “does not depend on treaty, executive order 
or legislative enactment” (200), but is rather an independent legal right 
which, though recognized by the Royal Proclamation, nevertheless pre-
dates it.10 Since it was not created by a sovereign performative, it does 
not depend on the sovereign’s will and cannot be extinguished at the 
sovereign’s pleasure. The only way to extinguish it is to pass legislation 
that clearly and plainly states the sovereign’s intention to extinguish, and 
in Canada the crown has historically made that intention clear and plain 
by striking treaties with fi rst nations, which means consulting them and 
securing their consent (199, 202–3). Hall’s opinion draws Nisa’a cus-
tomary law into the common law as a state of exception.
The Supreme Court of Canada consolidated the state of exception 
more than two decades later in R v. Van der Peet. Dorothy Marie Van 
der Peet was charged in 1987 with the crime of selling ten salmon. Her 
band, the Upper Sto:lo, had a license to catch fi sh for food, but not for 
sale. She argued, however, that in selling them she was exercising an ab-
original right (R v. Van Der Peet 23 BCLR 3rd at para 6). The Supreme 
Court found in 1996 that her right lay both inside and outside the law. 
Chief Justice Lamer cited the High Court of Australia’s fi nding in Mabo 
v. Queensland that an aboriginal right has its origin in and acquires its 
content from the traditional laws acknowledged and traditional customs 
observed by the indigenous inhabitants of a given territory (para. 40). 
Mabo confi rmed that the common law captures customary law within 
an internal-external space of exception, incorporating it without assimi-
lating it. The challenge for the Supreme Court of Canada was to preserve 
the common law from customary law’s legitimate, law-making force. 
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What the state feared in Van der Peet’s case, as in Sparrow’s, was neither 
the criminal nor the crime, but a performativity capable of founding a 
new law from within the law. Van der Peet argued that her right to sell 
the fi sh was protected by Part Two, Section Thirty-Five, paragraph one, 
of the Constitution Act, 1982, which states “the existing aboriginal and 
treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby recognized 
and affi rmed.” Lamer decided that the constitution includes aboriginal 
customs only insofar as it excludes them: “what s.35(1) does is provide 
the constitutional framework through which the fact that aboriginals 
lived on the land in distinctive societies, with their own practices, tradi-
tions and cultures is acknowledged and reconciled with the sovereignty 
of the Crown” (para. 31). The constitution seeks the “reconciliation” 
of two legal systems while affi rming that one system has “sovereignty” 
over the other. Reconciliation requires judges to weigh “the aboriginal 
perspective” against “the perspective of the common law.” True recon-
ciliation “will equally, place weight on each” (para. 50). Lamer did not 
say that it will place equal weight on each. For the aboriginal perspective 
belongs to the common law perspective only in the mode of not belong-
ing: “aboriginal rights exist within the general legal system of Canada,” 
he reasoned, and have to be defi ned “in terms that are cognizable to the 
non-aboriginal legal system” (para. 49). He defi ned an “aboriginal right” 
as what remains today of a practice, custom, or tradition that used to be 
“integral” to the “distinctive culture” of a distinctively aboriginal group 
in the past: it is something that “truly made” a society what it “was” 
(paras. 46 and 55). Such a right is like a ghost: it is the living presence 
of an era that came an end the moment aboriginal people came into 
contact with European adventurers (para. 60). The rights that the law 
recognizes now protect only those practices that existed before the law 
arrived. Aboriginal traditions, customs, and practices are included in the 
law now on the condition that they were excluded from the law then. 
They are inside it and outside it at one and the same time, and that time, 
moreover, is the past present: “the rights recognized and affi rmed by s. 
35(1) must be temporally rooted in the historical presence—the ances-
try—of aboriginal peoples in North America” (para 32): a presence that 
dates from “the period prior to contact” (para. 60). Aboriginal societies 
19
Su i  Gen e r i s :  Abo r i g in a l  Ti t l e  and  th e  St a t e  o f  Exc ep t i on
have a right to whatever is “integral” to them, and integrality is a past 
that happens now only. The court found that Van der Peet had an ab-
original right to fi sh, but not to exchange fi sh for money, for commer-
cial fi shing was an incidental rather than an integral part of pre-contact 
Upper Sto:lo culture.
The Federal Court had already settled on a formula for inclusive ex-
clusion in Baker Lake v. Canada. In 1979 a coalition of Inuit individu-
als and organizations asked for a declaration that they had an unex-
tinguished aboriginal right to hunt and fi sh on lands adjacent to the 
Hamlet of Baker Lake (Hamlet of Baker Lake v. The Minister of Indian 
Affairs, 107 DLR 3rd at 513). Justice Mahoney noted that the Supreme 
Court had already found in Calder that aboriginal title exists at common 
law, so he devised a four-part test to decide whether the present plain-
tiffs had a title to the Baker lake area. He required them to prove:
 1. That they and their ancestors were members of an organized 
 society.
 2. That the organized society occupied the specifi c territory over 
which they assert aboriginal title.
 3. That the occupation was to the exclusion of other organized 
 societies.
 4. That the occupation was an established fact at the time sovereignty 
was asserted by England. (542)
The Baker Lake test affi rms that aboriginal title is one part “organiza-
tion” and three parts “occupation.” What determines whether a society 
is “organized” or not? (And is there such a thing as an unorganized soci-
ety?) Mahoney decided that a society is organized if it observes the rules 
and customs of its ancestors (McNeil Common Law 284). Since being 
organized makes a society eligible for title, the existence of customary 
law is a necessary condition for recognition under common law. An ab-
original right is protected by the law only if, at one time, it fell outside 
the law. Such a right exists in the mode of inclusive exclusion.
Mahoney defi ned common law Inuit title as a right to hunt and fi sh: 
in the language of St. Catherine’s Milling, he decided that it is a usufruc-
tuary right (560). Four years later, in Guerin v. The Queen, the Supreme 
Court of Canada proposed another defi nition, indeed a unique one. 
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The Musqueam band had agreed to surrender certain reserve lands to 
the Crown for lease to a Vancouver golf club. The members of the band 
approved the terms of surrender at a public meeting. But the Indian 
Affairs Branch afterwards changed the terms without notice, and, pre-
dictably, the new terms were less favorable than those the band had ap-
proved (Guerin v. The Queen 2 SCR at 335). The court found that the 
crown had a fi duciary obligation to deal with the land for the band’s 
benefi t and was thus liable for damages. Justices Wilson and Dickson 
located the source of the crown’s obligation in the band’s aboriginal title 
(McNeil Common Law 285). Dickson wrote that aboriginal title is “an 
independent legal right” based on aboriginal people’s “historic occupa-
tion and possession” of the land (376, and 378). The fact that it is “in-
dependent” means it has a source in customary law. The fact that it 
is based on occupation and possession means it has a second, parallel 
source in common law. A pre-contact, customary “right” had been car-
ried forward into the common law under the doctrine of continuity 
(McNeil Common Law 286). “The principle that a change in sover-
eignty over a particular territory does not in general affect the presump-
tive title of the inhabitants,” Dickson observed, “was approved by the 
[Judicial Committee of ] the Privy Council in Amodu Tijani v. Southern 
Nigeria (Secretary)” in 1921 (378). But that is just what the state fears: 
the declaration of customary law within the borders of the common law. 
Dickson made it clear, however, that in his view this independent ab-
original right was nevertheless dependent on the sovereign’s paramount 
right. “Indians have a legal right to occupy and possess certain lands,” he 
explained, “the ultimate title to which is in the Crown” (382). But there 
is no term in general property law for a right that belongs without be-
longing to the genre of rights. Indeed Viscount Haldane had warned of 
the problem years earlier in Amodu Tijani v. Secretary, Southern Nigeria: 
“There is a tendency, operating at times unconsciously, to render [the 
native] title conceptually in terms of [legal] systems which have grown 
up under English law. But this tendency has to be held in check close-
ly.”11 Scholars of rhetoric have long called this “tendency” catachresis. It 
is what happens when you borrow a term that already has a meaning in 
one context and graft it to a context where a term is needed but none 
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is available, for example when you say that a chair has legs. Dickson 
noted that in the past judges have considered giving bands “benefi cial 
ownership” of reserve lands and have entertained the possibility that 
bands have “a benefi cial interest” in their reserves (381). There is “a core 
of truth” in both catachreses, he conceded, but still neither was “quite 
accurate” (382). So he introduced a third term, which was no less cata-
chrestic than the others. Aboriginal people, he wrote, have a “sui gene-
ris” interest in the land. A sui generis interest in one that belongs to a 
kind, a class—that is, a genus—of its own. What sets it apart from other 
interests? Dickson endowed it with two characteristic traits. First, it is 
personal, which means it can be surrendered only to the crown. Second, 
it burdens the crown with “a distinctive fi duciary obligation,” which 
binds the crown to manage the surrender of title for the benefi t of ab-
original people, not golf courses. “Any description of Indian title which 
goes beyond these two features,” he warned, “is both unnecessary and 
potentially misleading” (382).
Dickson’s defi nition of this sui generis interest does nothing more than 
repeat the law of genre in general. The law requires every genre to be 
of its own kind: “genres,” it says, “are not to be mixed” (Derrida “The 
Law of Genre” 223). Every genus is therefore bound to be sui generis. 
“As soon the word genre is sounded,” according to Derrida, “as soon 
as it is heard, as soon as one attempts to conceive it, a limit is drawn. 
And when a limit is established,” he adds, “norms and interdictions 
are not far behind . . . one must not cross a line of demarcation, one 
must not risk impurity, anomaly, monstrosity” (224–5). When Dickson 
declared aboriginal title to be of its own kind, he inscribed this kind 
of line around it, and the line’s purpose, furthermore, is to protect it 
from contamination. He set aboriginal title apart to protect aborigi-
nal people from being exploited by unscrupulous land purchasers and 
lessees. Its sui generis nature, he said, requires aboriginal people to sur-
render it only to the crown and obliges the crown to conduct the sur-
render in their best interest. The risk today, however, is not that aborigi-
nal title might be treated like other property interests, but that other 
property interests might be compromised by a declaration of aboriginal 
title. And the doctrine of reconciliation is now the fi rst line of defense. 
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The Supreme Court of Canada’s put it work for the fi rst time in late 
2004 in Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minster of Forests). There is 
a “need,” wrote Chief Justice McLachlin, “to reconcile prior Aboriginal 
occupation of the land with the reality of Crown sovereignty” (Haida 
nation v. British Columbia Minister of Forests 2004 SCC 73 at para 26). 
The term “reconciliation,” however, is a catachresis for the state of ex-
ception. “This process of reconciliation,” McLachlin explained, “fl ows 
from the Crown’s duty of honorable dealing towards Aboriginal peoples, 
which arises in turn from the Crown’s assertion of sovereignty over an 
Aboriginal people and de facto control of land and resources that were 
formerly in the control of that people” (para. 32). The fact that aborigi-
nal societies used to “control” the land in the past obliges the crown to 
exercise self-control when dealing with aboriginal interests in the pres-
ent. The crown controls itself because aboriginal people no longer con-
trol the “land and resources.” The doctrine of reconciliation, like the 
law of genre, is performative and normative at once: it subordinates ab-
original law to Canadian law and at the same time binds the crown to 
honor what it subordinates. The sovereign is not subject to restraint, but 
is called to exercise self-restraint. It is not ruled; it rules itself.
But what happens to the law when the law of genre fails? What if it 
were impossible not to mix genres? This is the question that Derrida 
puts to the law: “What if there were, lodged within the heart of the law 
itself, a law of impurity or a principle of contamination” (“The Law of 
Genre” 225)? Every genus is defi ned by its difference from other genera. 
Every genus must therefore by defi nition have some characteristic trait 
that distinguishes it from all others: “if a genre exists,” says Derrida, 
whether it is a genre of literature or genre of law, “then a code should 
provide an identifi able trait and one which is identical to itself, autho-
rizing us to adjudicate whether a given text belongs to this genre or per-
haps to that genre” (229). Every genre makes itself remarkable its own 
way. The “mark of belonging,” however, belongs to genre in general 
without belonging to any genre in particular (230). It marks the limits 
between one genre and another, and yet it exceeds every limit that it 
marks. “This can occur,” Derrida stresses, even “in texts that do not, at a 
given moment, assert themselves to be literary or poetic” (229).
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Indeed there is a unique genre of case law that distinguishes itself by 
affi rming the uniqueness of aboriginal title, and the mark that indicates 
whether or not a case belongs to this genre is the phrase “sui generis.” 
Yet as recently as 1997 Canadian courts had failed to specify what dis-
tinguishes a “sui generis” title from other property interests. It is true 
that Dickson had singled out two “features,” inalienability and fi du-
ciary obligation, but according to McNeil, the mark of belonging, in 
order to be effective, has to grow out of the source, not the defi nition, 
of aboriginal title. Otherwise there is a risk of generic contamination. 
By 1989 judges agreed that fi rst nations hold “some sort of communal 
legal title,” but they had “variously” located its source in “customary law, 
occupation and use of traditional lands, and the Royal Proclamation of 
1763, as though these possible sources can be lumped together to arrive 
at a uniform result” (McNeil Common Law 289). How can a sui gene-
ris right arise from different genres? Aboriginal title was supposed to be 
of its own kind, but the only unique thing about it was that it lacked 
that mark of belonging which distinguishes one kind from another: “No 
wonder they have had so much diffi culty in defi ning aboriginal title, 
and describing what the interest held thereby amounts to” (289).
The Supreme Court of Canada supplied the missing mark when it 
ruled on the appeal of Delgamuukw v British Columbia in 1997. The 
trial judge had answered the joint Gitxsan and Wet’suwewt’en claim 
with an echo of Judson’s ruling in Calder. He identifi ed two sources of 
title—the Royal Proclamation and prior occupation—and then he de-
cided that the Proclamation did not extend to British Columbia and that 
any title that could be based on occupation had been extinguished by 
the performative violence of the Calder thirteen (Delgmuukw v. British 
Columbia 79 DLR 4th at 194 and 197). The plaintiffs had only the right 
to live in their villages and a non-exclusive right to use the surrounding 
lands for “sustenance” (462). The British Columbia Court of Appeal 
agreed in 1993 that the action should be dismissed but found that the 
Calder thirteen had not extinguished all of the plaintiffs’s aboriginal 
rights (Delgamuukw v. British Columbia 79 DLR 4th at 471). Justice 
Macfarlane concluded that the plaintiffs continued to have “unextin-
guished non-exclusive aboriginal rights” but stressed that these rights do 
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not amount to a right of ownership or a right of property. “Such rights,” 
he explained wrote, “are of sui generis nature” (547) because they have 
their source in aboriginality itself. “What the law protects is not bare 
presence or all activities,” he wrote, “but those which were an integral 
part of and recognized by an aboriginal society prior to the assertion of 
sovereignty,” (512, 543) which he dated at the signing of the Oregon 
Boundary Treaty in 1846 (McNeil “Meaning of Aboriginal Title” 138). 
What makes an aboriginal society distinctively, legibly aboriginal, more-
over, is its pre-existing system of customary law: “I have said there is no 
question the Gitksan and Wet’suet’en people had an organized society. 
It is pointless,” he added, “to argue that such a society was without tra-
ditions, rules and regulations” (545). Customary law is an integral part 
of aboriginality, and aboriginality is a source of common law aborigi-
nal rights. “But those traditions, rules, and regulations cannot operate,” 
he warned, “if they are in confl ict with the laws of the province or of 
Canada” (545). Laws belonging to the customary law genre of aborigi-
nality do not necessarily belong to the common law genre of aboriginal 
rights. Or rather they belong without belonging.
Justice Wallace warned that to set up an aboriginal legal system within 
the Canadian legal system would result in a kind of monstrosity. “The 
assertion of an all-encompassing aboriginal right to an exclusive social 
and legal system—under the so-called ‘doctrine of continuity’ [this is a 
dig at McNeil]—would result,” he predicted, “in the common law af-
fording protection to a system which is both outside and independent 
of the common law” (569). Customary law and common law are two 
discrete legal genres, and genres, according to Wallace, are not to be 
mixed. Any effort to do so would result in contamination. Customary 
law would take root in common law from a position beyond the law. A 
parasite would work within the law to suspend the law. No longer would 
the sovereign have the power to decide on the state of exception; rather 
the exception would circumscribe the exercise of sovereign power. The 
only safe way to protect customary aboriginal practices, therefore, is 
to convert them into common law aboriginal rights: “customary prac-
tices,” according to Wallace, have “the protection of the common law” 
but “any system of aboriginal customary law” does not (577). Practices 
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are impurities: they bear traces of customary law, which threatens to 
contaminate the common law. Rights, however, are purifi ed practices: 
they “take their force” not from customary law, but “from the common 
law” (570). Wallace’s judgment has the paradoxical effect of excluding 
aboriginal people from a genre that includes only them. Aboriginal cus-
toms must be distinctively aboriginal in order to receive the protection 
of the common law, but only aboriginal law has the authority to deter-
mine which customs are distinctively aboriginal and which are not: “the 
post-sovereignty creation or alteration of aboriginal customs do not, and 
cannot have the force of law,” but neither, according to Wallace, can 
pre-sovereignty customs (577). Practices can be converted into rights 
on the condition that aboriginal people cease to be aboriginal. Wallace 
invented a genre that is truly of its own kind: a sui generis interest that 
nobody can claim.12
Chief Justice Lamer opened the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision 
by recalling that he had already ruled, in R v Coté, that aboriginal title is 
“a distinct species of aboriginal right” (Delgamuukw v. BritishColumbia 
153 DLR 4th at 201). By “species,” however, he meant “genus.” The 
court’s task in Delgamuukw was to defi ne “the specifi c content” of this 
distinct kind of right. The genus was fi nally about to receive its unique 
mark of belonging. Lamer decided that aboriginal title is a sui generis in-
terest in the land itself. One of the things that make this interest unique 
is that it participates, without full membership, in two genres of law. 
“Aboriginal title has been described as sui generis in order to distinguish 
it from ‘normal’ proprietary interests, such as fee simple. However,” he 
added, “it is also sui generis in the sense that its characteristics cannot 
be completely explained by reference either to the common law rules of 
real property or to the rules of property found in aboriginal legal sys-
tems” (241). The correct interpretation has to consider “both common 
law and aboriginal perspectives” while endorsing neither. Lamer could 
not not mix genres even though the law demanded that genres are not 
to be mixed.
He ruled, fi rst, that this sui generis interest can be surrendered only to 
the crown. Second, he traced its source to the prior occupation of the 
land by aboriginal societies. That means that it belongs to the common 
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law precisely because it pre-dates it: “What makes aboriginal title sui ge-
neris is that it arises from possession before the assertion of British sov-
ereignty, whereas normal estates, like fee simple, arise afterward” (242). 
Because it pre-dates it, moreover, it has a parallel source in “aboriginal 
systems of law” (246). The assertion of sovereignty simultaneously ex-
tended the jurisdiction of the common law and opened up a pocket 
inside it for the inclusive exclusion of customary law. Aboriginality is the 
sovereign’s outer limit, but it is traced within rather than around the sov-
ereign’s domains. The outside of the law has from the outset of Canadian 
of history resided on the inside of the law, in the form of a title that bur-
dens the crown’s underlying title (254). Finally, Lamer reaffi rmed that 
this burdensome title is a communal rather than individual right.
Since the courts had “never” defi ned “the content of aboriginal title,” 
he ventured a defi nition of his own (242). It consists of two proposi-
tions. First, aboriginal title is “the right to exclusive use and occupation 
of the land” for “purposes” that may or may not be “integral” to “dis-
tinctive aboriginal cultures” (243). Second, however, aboriginal title ex-
tends only to those uses that can be reconciled “with the nature of the 
group’s attachment to that land” (243). What the fi rst proposition ex-
cludes, the second includes. The fi rst annuls the genre of aboriginality: 
title-holders can use and occupy the land in “non-aboriginal” ways. The 
second reinstates it: there is an “inherent limit” on non-aboriginal uses 
of aboriginal lands (246). The law protects aboriginal title in order to 
protect the aboriginality of aboriginal people, and the characteristic trait 
of aboriginality, according to Lamer, is the aboriginal person’s “special 
bond”—indeed species bond—with the land itself. “That relationship,” 
he found, “should not be prevented from continuing into the future. As 
a result, uses of the lands that would threaten that future relationship 
are, by their very nature, excluded from the content of aboriginal title” 
(247). Formerly the courts protected aboriginal people from third par-
ties; henceforth they will protect aboriginal people from themselves.
How can a court tell aboriginal from non-aboriginal uses? George 
Copway affi rmed in 1850 that the only way to hunt in a distinctively 
aboriginal way is to obey the distinctively aboriginal laws of property. 
“The hunting grounds of the Indians were secured by right,” he recalls 
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in his autobiography, “a law and custom among themselves. No one was 
allowed to hunt on another’s land, without invitation or permission” 
(74). Aboriginal title is distinguished from other proprietary interest by 
its aboriginality, but what constitutes aboriginality can only be decided 
by aboriginal law. When Lamer affi rmed that “aboriginality” must not 
be mixed with other genres, then, he acknowledged the principle of ab-
original self-government (McNeil “Defi ning Aboriginal Rights in the 
90s” 13–14). 
Yet he went on to assert that aboriginal title can be infringed when-
ever the infringement serves a “compelling and substantial” legislative 
objective, though he cautioned that any infringement has to honor the 
“fi duciary relationship” between settler governments and fi rst nations 
(260–2). What genre of objective meets the infringement test? In Haida 
Nation v B.C., McLachlin decided that the test can be applied in cases 
where aboriginal title has been claimed but not yet proven (paras. 6 and 
10–11). Hence there can be infringement even before there is a title to 
infringe. Aboriginal title is the kind of right that can be excepted from 
the law before it has been included in the law. McLachlin found that 
the government of British Columbia had failed in its honorable duty 
“to consult with and reasonably accommodate” Haida interests when 
renewing a timber license in a traditional Haida territory (para. 27). In 
a simultaneous ruling, however, she found that the province had “thor-
oughly” fulfi lled its duty to consult with the members of the Taku River 
Tlingit First Nation while planning the construction of a mining road 
on their territory. She accordingly let their title be infringed before it 
had been established it either by negotiation or in court (Taku River 
Tlingit First Nation v. British Columbia Project Assesment Director 2004 
SCC 74 at paras 41 and 44).
McNeil points out that the infringement test ignores that English law 
has protected property rights for more than eight hundred years and for-
gets that s.35 (1) was intended to defend aboriginal rights from govern-
ment interference (“Defi ning Aboriginal Rights in the 90s” 26). What 
he forgets in turn is that the sovereign cannot abide a law that resides 
at once inside and outside the law. The common law takes hold of cus-
tomary law by way of inclusive exclusion, for the capture forestalls that 
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performative violence which not only is not alien to the law, but is that 
which in the law suspends the law for legitimate ends: “a pure performa-
tive that would not have to answer to or before anyone” (Derrida “The 
Force of the Law” 992–3). Only by such a performative can an excep-
tion emerge within the state of exception.
Legal dictionaries typically put the phrase sui generis in a class of its 
own. West’s Encyclopedia of American Law is among the most concise: 
“SUI GENERIS” [Latin, Of its own kind or class.] That which is the 
only one of its kind.” Though it belongs to its own kind, though, it nev-
ertheless includes more than one kind of right. Black’s Law Dictionary 
is among the most expansive: “sui generis (s[y]oo-I or soo-ee jen- -ris). 
[Latin “of its own kind”]. Of its own kind or class; unique or peculiar. 
The term is used in intellectual-property law to describe a regime de-
signed to protect rights that fall outside the traditional patent, trade-
mark, copyright, and trade-secret doctrines.” Still it is The Dictionary 
of Canadian Law that best captures the uniqueness of the unique inter-
est that is aboriginal title: “SUI GENERIS. [L.] Of one’s own class or 
kind.” Whatever is sui generis is of “one’s” own kind. A sui generis right 
therefore amounts to the right of the one. Or is it one’s right to be in-
cluded in a law that excludes one? For there is only one law, and it is 
closed to the possibility of a law that would undo it from inside its own 
limits. Aboriginal title: it is our kind of right.
Notes
 1 See Carl Schmitt in Giorgio Agamben. Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare 
Life, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford UP, 1998) 11. 
 2 See Agamben, Homo Sacer, 3–5; Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality. Volume 
1: An Introduction, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage, 1978), 139.
 3 In 1984 the Supreme Court of Canada reiterated that the crown has an obli-
gation “to prevent the Indians from being exploited” by land purchasers and 
lessees; in November 2004 the Court reaffi rmed that the crown has an honour-
able duty to protect aboriginal peoples’ rights and interests in the management 
of resources. See Guerin v. The Queen 2 SCR, at 336; Haida Nation v. British 
Columbia (Minister of Forests), 2004 SCC 73, at para. 20 and 27.
 4 See McNeil “The Meaning of Aboriginal Title” Aboriginal Treaty Rights in 
Canada, ed. Michael Asch (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1997), 137; Common Law 
Aboriginal Title (Oxford: Clarendon P, 1989), 288–9.
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 5 This is currently the opinion of the Supreme Court of Canada. See Haida Nation 
v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests), 2004 SCC 73, at para. 25.
 6 See McNeil, Common Law Aboriginal Title, 171; Re Southern Rhodesia AC 211, 
at 233.
 7 See McNeil, Common Law Aboriginal Title, 172; Amodu Tijani v. Secretary, 
Southern Nigeria 2 AC, at 407.
 8 See St. Catharine’s Milling and Lumber Company v. The Queen, 14 AC 1889, 
at 54; Calder v. Attorney-General of British Columbia 34 DLR 3rd at 156; 
Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, 79 DLR 4th at 197, 417, 453–4 and 478.
 9 This is Judson citing the trial judge, Justice Gould. Calder et al. v. Attorney 
General of British Columbia 34 DLR 3rd at 81–2, and 34 DLR 3rd at 160.
 10 This is Dickson’s 1984 interpretation of “the assumption implicit in Calder”; 
Guerin v. The Queen, 2 SCR at 378.
 11 Amodu Tijani v. Secretary, Southern Nigeria 2 AC at 403; see also Calder v. 
Attorney-General of British Columbia 34 DLR 3rd at 187.
 12 McNeil tells us, in “The Meaning of Aboriginal Rights,” that, “this places the 
Aboriginal peoples in an untenable position. To retain their aboriginal rights, 
they must maintain their societies in a precolonial state . . . If they try to adapt to 
meet the changes in circumstances caused by European colonization . . . their ac-
tivities are no longer ‘Aboriginal’ and so are not encompassed by their Aboriginal 
rights” (152).
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